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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
79 So. 61; Lawrence v. Stone (1909) 160 Ala. 382, 49 So. 376. But the
majority of modern cases reach the opposite result. Taylor v. Hunstead
& Taylor (Tex. Com. App. 1924) 257 S. W. 232; Torrey v. Br'uner (1910)
60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337. Missouri has uniformly held in contract cases that
the judgment is valid against the defendants properly served. Nations v.
Beard (1924) 216 Mo. A. 33, 267 S. W. 19; Boyd 'v. Ellis (1891) 107 Mo.
A. 394, 18 S. W. 29; Williams v. Hudson (1887) 93 Mo. 524, 6 S. W. 261;
Lenox v. Clark (1873) 52 Mo. 115. The question presented by the principal
case is whether there is sufficient reason to reach the opposite result in
tort cases.
The reason given by the Missouri court in reaching its decision is that
because of the statute of contribution an injustice would be worked by the
other possible result. The statute, R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4223, reads as
follows: "Defendants in a judgment founded on an action for a private
wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such
judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as defendant in an
action founded on contract. . . ." It is evident that the purpose of the
statute was to give a right of contribution in tort cases equal to the right
in contract cases. But as we have seen, the Missouri court will not in a
contract case declare a judgment void against all defendants merely because
some are not served, notwithstanding the right of contribution among joint
obligors. Why this right of contribution should be given greater importance
in a tort case is difficult to see, in view of the fact that the statute creating
the right declares it to be the same as in a contract action. In either case
the right exists whether or not the joint obligors or tort-feasors are joined;
and since it was not necessary that they be joined in the first instance, fail-
ure to serve one should not invalidate the judgment against the others.
It is true of course that no judgment against 'defendants improperly
served should be recorded; but it does not necessarily follow that it should
therefore be declared entirely void. The names of those not served should
be striken from the record but the judgment alllowed to be good against
those who have had their day in court. Against them the plaintiff has com-
mitted no error. J. A. G., '31.
TRESPASS BY AIRPLANE-EXTENT OF ESTATES IN LAND.-Plaintiff owned
an estate next to defendant's air port, so located that planes frequently
passed over plaintiff's land at low altitudes in landing and taking off. Be-
ing able to prove no actual damage, plaintiff sought to enjoin what he al-
leged was a technical trespass to his land. The court recognized the tres-
pass but denied the injunction on the grounds that planes never pass twice
in the same place, that there was no danger of a prescriptive easement,
and that no damage was shown. Smith v. New England Aircraft Go.
(Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 385.
At common law, property in land was said to extend upward to infinity.
"Cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos." Co. Litt. 4a;
17 C. J. 391; Broom, LEGAL MAXIMs (9th ed. 1924) 260; Hannabalson v.
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Sessions (1902) 116 Iowa 458, 90 N. W. 93; Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co.
(1906) 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716. In England a different rule was
adopted by statute in 1920, flight being declared not to be a trespass at
any height. 10 & 11 Geo. V. c. 80, sec. 9 (1920); Roedean School v. Cornwall
Av. Co., Ltd. (1926) unreported but noted 70 SOL. J. 787; Logan, AIRcRAFr
LAW MADE PLAIN (1928) 17.
The Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, forbids flight at an altitude
less than 500 feet, and Massachusetts has a similar law. Mass. Laws 1928,
p. 496. The holding of the court is therefore clearly correct; but in refus-
ing to predict what it would do if the altitude were over 500 feet the court
declares that the Latin maxim is not law. "It would be vain to treat
property in airspace upon the same footing as property which can be
seized .... built upon, and utilized in its every feature. The experience
of mankind, although not necessarily a limitation upon rights, is the basis
upon which airspace must be regarded." The doctrine of the Smith case
may become settled law so that the air, like the sea, will be free to all
navigators. D. K. B., '31.
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